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7677 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
REX PACE, BYRON PACE, KEITH PACE 
AND HARVEY PACE, 
Plaintiffs and Resp?ndents 
vs. 
JOSEPH A. PARRISH and IDA E. PARRISH, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 7677 
F I L E1}--
oc~~ 18 l~o1 L. TOM PERRY, 
_______ ,_f.RES!ON AND HARRIS, 
---~-~:;;.k,-S~~r-~~~Court, R1t¥3rneys for Defendants 
and Appellants. 
Appeal from the District Court of the Second Judicial 
District, in and for Morgan County, State of Utah. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
REX PACE, BYRON PACE, KEITH PACE 
AND HARVEY PACE, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents 
vs. 
JOSEPH A. PARRISH and IDA E. PARRISH, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
STATEMENT-OF FACTS 
In the month of October, 1947 Defendants, Joseph 
A. Parrish, and his wife, Ida E. Parrish, were the owenrs 
of a farm consisting of approximately 640 acres, situated 
at Mountain Green, Weber c·ounty, Utah. The Plaintiffs, 
consisting of the father, Harvey Pace, and his three sons, 
Rex Pace, Bryon Pace, and Keith Pace, had contracted to 
sell their farm in Boeneta, Duchesne County, Utah, for 
the sum of $50,000.00 (Tr. 28) and we~e looking for 
another farm large enough to supply the needs of the 
three boys. Sometime during the month of October, the 
exact date being in dispute, Rex Pace, one of the Plaintiffs, 
interviewed the Defendants at their home in Mountain 
Green. In this interview the parties discussed the acreage, 
water rights, and fences on the Parrish farm, and the 
parties tentatively agreed on the sale of the property by 
the Defendants to the Plaintiffs for the sum of $50,000.00. 
This tentative agreement was subject to inspection of the 
premises by the Plaintiffs and it being approved by the 
father and the older two sons. (Tr. 28, 29). 
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Witness Rex Pace in reporting the interview testified 
that at the conclusion of the same, Defendant Joseph E. 
Parrish told Plaintiff Rex Pace, "I own the reservoir. The 
resevoir is on my place.n (Tr. 29). Defendant Joseph E. 
Parrish admits that at a later time while he was showing 
them the property he told the Plaintiffs that the reservoir 
was ''on his property." ( Tr. 130). 
On October 17, 1951, Rex Pace, his father, and one 
brother, Byron Pace, came to the Parrish home for the 
purpose of inspecting the property. Mr. Parrish and the 
three defendants got in the Pace's car and were shown 
over the property. When they came to a point some 
I 
distance below the reservoir, Mr. Parrish told them that 
a certain hollow belonged to the place. (Tr. 129). They 
then proceeded to the reservoir located on the Parrish 
property, inspected some of the property lying beyond 
and returned, according to the testimony of Rex and Byron 
Pace, to a point, marked "A" which is west of the reser-
voir and about one-half mile above the Rollins land. At 
this point, where they could see the south field, the river 
bottom, a tract of 11* acres belonging to one Lee Rollins, 
and across the valley, (Tr. 32) Mr. Parrish is alleged to 
have said, "J3rother all you see below us belongs to me." 
They then proceeded down the hill to within 200 feet of 
the Rollins property, traversing their route over the so-
called "bottom land" in Sec. 19. The plaintiffs got out of 
the car and inspected the river bottom land ( Tr. 60) a:nd 
also inspected the south field. (Tr. 44). While here Mr. 
Parrish is alleged to have said, "The ground in Section 19 
is of the same texture as that in the south field." ( Tr. 45). 
The parties agreed on the sale, and planned to go to Logan, 
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Utah, to sign the legal papers consummating the transac-
tion. 
On December 4, 1947, on arrival of the Paces at 
Logan, Mr. and Mrs. Parrish, Harvey Pace, Byron Pace, 
and Keith Pace met Attorney L. Tom Perry in the First 
National Bank of Logan, and agreed that he should pre-
pare the following: (Tr. 76 and 83). 
1. A warranty deed conveying the property to the 
father and his three sons, Harvey Pace, Rex Pace, Byron 
Pace, and Keith Pace. 
2. A purchase money mortgage from the four Paces 
and their wives to secure the balance due on the farm and 
notes for $40,000.00. 
3. A bill of sale to the personal property that went 
with the farm. 
4. A chattel mortgage on the personal property sold 
as additional security for the balance due. 
5. An agreement that the warranty deed and Bill of 
Sale was to be held by the attorney until the chattel mort-
gage, real estate mortgage and abstract were placed in 
his hands. The mortgages to be signed by all parties 
including Rex Pace and the wives of the parties, delivered 
to said attorney, who was then authorized to deliver the 
deed and bill of sale to the Plaintiffs. 
They then left the attorney's office agreeing to return 
when the papers were prepared. 
In the meantime Wallace Parrish, a son of the de-
fendants, took the Paces for a ride over Cache County. 
They were gone about 6 hours. ( Tr. 193). While on this 
trip Wallace told the Paces that o_thers had an interest in 
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the reservoir. ( Tr. 165, 168, and 170) and that the 11:J4 
acres belonged to Mr. Rollins. (Tr. 166-167) .. However, 
Byron Pace testified that during this ride they made no 
inquiries concerning the land they were about to buy. 
(Tr. 193-194). 
The parties met in the attorney's office at about 3:30 
p. m. on the same day. The warranty deed, describing 
the land and containing this reference to the water rights: 
"Together with the tenements, hereditaments and 
appurtenances thereunto belonging or in any wise 
appertaining, including all water and water right~ 
used in connection with the land." (Record . page 
A32). 
was read by the Paces and signed by the defendants and 
delivered to the attorney to be held by him until the real 
estate mortgage and chattel mortgage were returned. 
(Exhibit H.) (Tr. 84.) The real estate and chattel mort-
gage and the notes for the balance of the purchase price 
w~re signed by Harvey Pace, Byron Pace, and Keith Pace 
(Tr. 84-85) and taken out of the office by the Paces for 
further signatures. A check for $10,000.00 was given to 
the defenda~ts by the plaintiffs as a down payment. 
(Tr. 76). The plaintiffs paid another $10,000.00 in May, 
1948 and $2,000.00 in May 1950. ( Tr. 61). 
On Dec. 4, 1947 an inquiry was made concerning the 
division of the water and Byron Pace asked, "How come 
that Lee Rollins divides the water. We thought we got 
all the water." (Tr. 77). 
~1r. Parrish then informed Harvey Pace, Byron Pace 
and Keith Pace that others besides himself had an interest 
in the reservoir. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 
The mortgage notes, and escrow agreement were then 
taken to Rex Pace. He signed these instruments on De-
cember 15, 1947, after he had learned that others besides 
the defendants had an interest in the water in the reser-
voir. CI'r. 63, 68, 85). Later the mortgages were signed 
by the wives of the parties, and the mortgages and agree-
ments were returned to Logan. As soon as the abstract 
was secured the Federal Land Bank and brought up to 
date. It and the warranty deed and bill of sale to the 
personal property was mailed to them and the notes and 
mortgages were delivered to the defendants. 
In January, 1950, the plaintiffs brought an action 
against the defendants for fraud and deceit in connection 
\\t'"ith the transaction praying for damages against the de-
fendants in the sum of $25,000.00. Alleging that he 
defendants had made the following misrepresentations: 
A. That they misrepresented the amount and char-
acter of the water rights that went with the property. 
B. That they had misreprsented the quantity of the 
land being sold. 
C. That they had misrepresented the right, title and 
ownership of certain personal property. 
D. The quality and condition of land in a portion 
of the property known as the "south field." 
E. That they had misrepresented the quality of the 
"river bottom land." 
F. 'That they had misrepresented the condition of 
the fences on the property. 
The action was tried before a jury. The jury denied 
any relief on the alleged misrepresentation concerning the 
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right, title and ownership of certain personal property and 
any damages for the alleged misrepresentation ·of the 
quality of the land in the "south field." The court ap-
proving the answers of the jury to interrogatories sub-
mitted to them entered judgment against the defendants 
in the sum of $8,650.00 and ordered that the "amount of 
said damages and costs shall be deducted from the unpaid 
part of the purchase price indebtedness now owed the 
defendants by the plaintiffs by reason of the defendants 
sale to the plaintiffs of that certain farm which was part 
of the subject matter of this action." Judgment entered 
December 12, 1950. 
From this judgment the defendants appeal. 
In th~ trial, the court, at the request of plaintiffs, 
called in the jury. At the conclusion of the testimony the 
court under Rule 49 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
in response to a request of the parties submitted to the 
jury certain interrogatories. These interrogat~ries did not 
cover every issue of fact. Under said Rule 49 where "the 
court omits any issue of fact raised by the pleadings or by 
the evidenc~, each party waives his right to a trial by jury 
of the issue so omitted unless before the jury retires he 
demands its submission to the jury. As to an issue 
omitted without such demand the court may make a fin-
ding; or, if it ·fails to do so, it shall be deemed to have 
made a finding in accord with the·judgment on the special 
verdict." 
STATEMENT OF POINTS UPON WHICH APPEL-
LANT INTENDS TO RELY FOR REVERSAL OF JUDG-
MENT AND DECREE. 
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POINT Ill. THE COURT ERRED IN RENDERING 
A JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANTS FOR THE 
ALLEGED FALSE REPRESENTATIONS CONCERN-
ING THE QUALITY OF THE RIVER BOTTOM LAND 
IN SECl'ION 19. 
In this conne_Qtion the court erred in adopting and 
approving its own findings of fact the following answer 
of the jury: 
1. That the defendant Joseph A. Parrish represented 
to the plaintiffs that the land in the river bottom is of the 
same quality as the land in the south field. 
2. That such representation was false. 
3. That the plaintiffs relied on the alleged statement 
of defendant as to the quality of the river bottom land and 
not upon their own inspection. 
That the court likewise erred in making the following 
implied findings of fact. 
1. That defendant intended to deceive the plaintiffs 
as to the quality of land in the river bottom. 
2. That plaintiffs had the right to rely on any al-
leged false ~tatemen~s of defendant with reference to the 
quality of the land in the river bottom. 
POINT IV: THAT THE COURT ERRED IN 
DENYING DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR A NEW 
TRIAL. 
POINT V: THAT THE COURT ERRED IN AP-
PROVING SPECIAL FINDINGS OF THE JURY, TO-
WIT: VII A, VIlA( 1 ), VII A(3 ), VII A( 4), VII A( 5), 
and VII B. (Record on appeal page A56-7). 
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ARGUMENT 
This is an action in equity. 
"It is frequently said in a general way that grounds 
for equitable relief exist in, or that chancery courts 
have jurisdiction over cases arising out of fraud. In-
deed the statement is recurrent that there is no other 
ground on which equity jurisdiction is so readily and 
frequently entertained." 19 Am. Jr. page 63. 
"But equity jurisdiction is not conferred by a mere 
charge of fraud." 19 Am. Jr. page 64. 
"Equity jurisdiction is to be .sustained unless the 
remedy at law is complete and will secure to the liti-
gant the whole right involved in a manner as just and 
perfect as that attainable in a suit in equity." 19 Am. 
Jr. page 65. 
In the instant case it may be contended that if the 
plaintiffs had asked only for damages for the fraud and 
if thf!t were all the relief a~ked equity would not entertain 
jurisdiction. But the plaintiff goes further. He fears that 
mere damages would not be adequate as the notes signed 
by the plaintiffs to secure the balance due on the contract 
may reach the hands of an innoc~nt party so he prays 
that "the Court shall order the (damages) same to be de-
ducted from the unpaid part of the purchase price yet to 
be paid by the defendants." (Record on appeal page 5). 
In so doing he seeks relief that can not be secured 
by a court of law and in seeking an equitable remedy he 
invokes the jurisdiction of equity and must be bound by 
the rules of equity. 
The relief he seeks may be likened to the party who 
seeks an equitable set-of£. In order to avoid a separate 
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action he seeks to have the rights of the parties consoli-
dated in one action. 
"Set-off by a bill in equity was recognized at an early 
date, the purpose of a court in chancery being to ad-
just in one suit conflicting demands, if, from the re-
lations between the parties ~nd the nature of their 
claims, equity and justice are· shown to require com-
plete settlement." 19 Am. Jur. page 124. 
Forrester vs. Jastad 167 P 55, was an action for 
damages for false representation in the sale of land. In 
response to the prayer of this complaint "the court asses-
sed the damages of plaintiffs in the sum· of $500,_ and 
directed the cancellation of the note for that sum, which 
was past due, and further made its restraining order 
against the transfer of that note permanent." 
In rendering the opinion the court said: 
"The ess_ence of the action . is to relieve respondents 
from liability on notes procured from them. ~y fraud, _ 
and to restrain the negotiation of such notes to an 
innocent holder, whereby the liability of respondents 
would be confirmed, and the appellants enabled to 
place t];lemselves in a position to defeat the enforce-
ment of any judgment against them for damages. 
The action is cognizable in equity.~~ 
One of the rules of equity by which plaintiffs are 
bound is that of the attitude of this court on appeal. It 
was said in the case of Jensen vs. Howell 75 ( Ut.) 64 
282 Pac. 1034: 
"This case is one in equity. In this jurisdicition the 
binding effect of findings on the trial court in law 
·cases is different from that in equity cases. In the 
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former, the findings as a general rule, are approved 
if there is sufficient competent evidence to support 
them, and ordinarily are not disturbed, unless it is 
manifest, that they are so clearly against the weight 
of the evidence as to indicate a misconception, or not 
due considera~i?n of it. In the latter, our duty and 
responsibility in approving or disapproving findings 
when challenged are more comprehensive. In such 
cases, on an appeal and a review of questions of law 
and fact, and on a challenge of the findings, the re-
view in effect is trial da nova on the record. On such 
a review, if after making due allowance as the better 
opportunity of the trial court to observe the demeanor 
of the witnesses, of determining their credibility and 
the weight of their testimony, we on the record never-
theless are persuaded that a challenged finding is 
against the fair preponderance or greater weight of 
the evidenc, or not supported by it, we disapprove it, 
and make or direct a finding or remand the cause for 
further proceeding; otherwise to affirm it." · 
"In reaching the conclusion as we do that plaintiff 
has failed to establish his right to have the deed in quest-
ion set aside we are not unmindful of the rule frequently 
announced by this court to the effect that it will not dis-
turb the trial court' s __ findings unless it is reasonably clear 
that such findings are against the evidence. Such rule is 
in part founded on the fact that the trial court has the 
opportunity to see the witnesss and to observe their de-
meanor while testifying and is therefore in a better posi-
tion to determine the weight which should be to the evi-
dence than the members of this court who do not have 
that opportunity. The rule however does not relieve this 
court from the responsibility placed upon it by the Con-
sitution and laws of this state of weighing the evidence 
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and determining the facts. In equity cases the parties are 
entitled to a judgment of this court as to facts." Greco v. 
Graco, 39 P 2nd 318, 85 Utah 241. 
The above case was one of alleged fraud where the 
court reversed the judgment of the trial court. 
The only essiantial facts in dispute in the instant 
case is where and what was said by defendant with re-
spect to the ownership of the reservorr and whether 
plaintiffs were informed by Wallace Parrish that others 
had an interest in the reservoir before three of them signed 
the note and mortgage. 
Also where the parties were when Parrish told plain-. 
tiffs that certain land belonged to him and whether Wal-
lace Parrish on December 4, 1947 told plaintiffs that he 
11% acres belonged to Rollins. 
Even though all of these facts are resolved in favor of 
plaintiffs yet on the undisputed evidence, they should 
not prevail. 
Few primary facts are in dispute. It is the court and 
jury's deduction from these facts that we take issue. The 
intent of the defendant to influence plaintiffs when he 
made certain statements; the right of plaintiffs to rely on 
such statements; as to what tract of land defendants, had 
in mind when he is alleged to have said "all the land you 
see below us belong to me," the amount of damage are the 
important questions to be decided in this case. Such 
questions being but deductions from primary facts we 
submit that this court has equal rights with the trial court 
and jury to make such deductions. 
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ARGUMENT - POINT I 
1. The elements of fraud are: 
( 1) a representation 
( 2 ) its falsity 
( 3) its materiality 
( 4) The speakers knowledge of its falsity or ignor-
ance of its truth 
( 5) his intent that it should be acted upon by the 
person in a manner reasonably contemplated 
( 6) the hearer's ig~orance of its falsity 
(7) his reliance upon its truth 
( 8) his right to rely thereon 
( 9) his consequent and possible injury. 
Stuck vs. Delta Land and Water Co. 227 P. 791, 63 U 
495; Campbell vs. Zions Co-op 148 P. 406, 46 Utah 1: .Jones 
vs. Pingree 73 Utah 190, 273 P. 303; Kinnear vs. Prows 16 
P2d 1094, 81 Ut. 135. 
2. Each of the elements of fraud must be proved 
with reasonable certainty, and all of them must be found 
from the evidence to exist. The absence of any of these 
elements is fatal to the plaintiff.. Jones vs. Pingree 273 P. 
303, 73 u. 190. 
3. The burden of proof is on he who asserts fraud 
and it must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. 
Campbell vs. Zions Co-op (Ante. ) ; Farrell vs. Wish well 
143 P. 582 45 Utah 252; Taylor vs~ Moore 51 P. 2nd 
222, 87 Ut. 202; 55 Am. Jur. page 540. 
The first allegation of fraud is that the defendants 
made certain false representations concerning the owner-
ship of the reservoir. 
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Quoting from their complaint: 
"4 (a) The defendant Joseph A. Parrish, showed 
plaintiff a large made reservoir, located entirely on 
the aforesaid premises and said~ 'The reservoir be-
longs to me.' 
"That in truth and in fact the reservoir was owned 
jointy with three other persons." ( R. A2). ~ 
The testimony of the plaintiffs supporting this alle-
gation is very brief. I quote all. 
Rex Parrish. on his first visit to the farm in October, 
1947, says that he and Mr. Parrish at that first visit "went 
over the deal, acreage, water rights, fences, and several 
other things." (Tr. 27). Then this question was asked, 
"Was there any discussion relative to how much water 
was on the place while you we~e there?" And this was 
his answer, "He (Mr. Parrish) said, 'I own the reservoir. 
The reservoir is on my place.' " ( Tr. 29). 
That is the sum total of plaintiff's direct evidence to 
sustain this element of fraud. 
Later, on a visit to the farm by three defendants, 
Harvey Pace, Rex Pace and Byron Pace, water rights were 
discussed. According to the plaintiffs, on this visit when 
they_ came to the reservoir, only this muclr is said: 
Q. "What was the first thing you observed when 
you got up the dugway? 
A. The reservoir. 
Q. While at the reservoir, did Mr. Parrish make any 
statements to you relative to the reservoir? 
R. indicates Record on appeal. 
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A. None at all, no statements at that time, as I recall, 
other than he says, 'This is the reservoir.' 
Q. Did you ask Mr. Parrish if any other parties 
owned any interest in the reservoir? 
A. "No." (Tr. 30). 
If a case of fraud is made, it must be made on that 
testimony. 
Defendant admits that he told the plaintiffs that the 
reservoir was "on his property." ( Tr. 130). . And the jury 
found that such a statement was made. (Tr. 212 R. A53). 
The Court wisely did not submit to the jury the question 
of the truth or falsity of this statement for the determina-
tion of that question was not in issue, plaintiffs having 
admitted in their complaint that the reservoir was on the 
property of the defendant. (Record on appeal p. 2). 
Admitting for the purpose of argument that defend-
ant told plaintiff that "the reservoir was on his place," we 
must test that statement to determine whether it consti-
tutes such fraud or deceit as will enable plaintiff to re-
cover. 
One element of fraud that is not sustained by either 
the preponderance of the evidence or by clear and con-
vincing evidence is the fradulent intent of the defendant 
in f:Uaking the statement. It must ever be kept in mind 
that it is what the defendant actually said and not what 
the plaintiffs thought he meant that determines the ques-
of fraud. 
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"Fraud is never presumed . When a statement is 
explainable upon a theory of fair dealing, that theory 
should be adopted.'' Southern Development Co. of 
Nevada vs. Silva 125 U.S. 247, 31 L.Ed. 678, 55 Am. 
Jr. page 540. 
"Futhermore, an alleged representation must be 
considered in the light of the conversation under 
which it is made, ahd may not be lifted out of its 
context nor considered apart from the circumstances 
or situation where it was made. Nor can an alleged 
misrepresentation be given a meaning which cannot 
be reasonably attached to it." Oberg vs. Sanders 
184 P2d 229, 111 Ut. 507. 
The evidence is none too clear as to the circumstances 
under which plaintiff made the alleged statement, "I own 
the reservoir. The reservoir is on my place." Mr. Parrish 
testifies that he told the plaintiffs the reservoir was on 
his place the day they made the inspection of the farm 
and viewed the reservoir: 
"I told them the reservoir was on my property but 
I didn't tell them that the water in 'the reservoir be-
ionged to me. I was just showing :them the property, 
that it was on my property, that res_ervoir, but I don't 
remember that I told them the amount of water. I 
don't believe that I did at that time, because I was 
showing them the property; then, we went from th~re 
out. 
Q. Just a minute you say the water rights to the 
property were not discussed at that time? · 
A. No. 
Q. You just pointed out where the land was with 
reference to the reservoir. 
A. That is right." (Tr. 130). 
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Witness Rex is not too clear on the point. He re-
members that the statement was made while ;he and 
Parrish were in the automobile and the only time they 
were in the automobile was on the inspection trip. It is 
unlikely that a crippled man would follow Rex from the 
house and get into his automobile at that first visit. 
( Tr. 29). At the time of the inspection trip Rex t~stifies 
that ~lr. Parrish showed them the reservoir but nothing 
was said as to the interest of others either in the reservoir 
or the waters therein. ( Tr. 29 30, and 31 ) . 
Rex is too evasive in his answer to determine much 
about the circumstances of the conversation. When asked 
(Tr. 29). "Was there any discussion relative to how much 
water was on the place?" He made no direct answer, but 
replied, "He said, 'I 9wn the reservoir. The reservoir is 
on my place.' " 
In determining the intent of the defendant we must 
ever keep in mind defendanfs exact language. He simply 
said, according to plaintiffs, "I own the. reservoir;" (Tr. 29) 
according to defendants, "The resevoir is on my place." 
(Tr. 130). And that is all the jury found that he said. 
(R. A53, Tr. 212). He made no statement with reference 
to the ownership or the right to use the water in the 
reservoir. 
It is true that the jury found that the plaintiffs would· · · 
not have purchased the property had they known that 
others had an interest in the water in the reservoir. 
( Tr. 212). But that question should never have been 
asked. It was asked over the objection of the defendant. 
( Tr. 200). It suggested to the jury something the de-
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fendant never said or intended to say. ( Tr. 130). Being 
improperly asked the court should never have approved 
it as an implied finding and concluded from such answer 
that defendant intended to represent to the plaintiffs that 
he had the exclusive right to use all of the waters in the 
reservoir. 
One determines the intent of a man by what he says; 
it is never safe to determine his intent by what one thinks 
he meant to say. 
Considering the statement of defendant, and the cir-
cumstances under which it was given, one may well con-
clude that the reservoir was referred to to identify the 
extent of the property and with no intent to deceive. If 
defendant had said "I have the exclusive right to the use 
of the water in the reservoir," then. a different intent may 
have been inferred. 
THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT FOUND THAT 
THE PLAINTIFFS IN PURCHASING THE PROPERTY 
RELIED ON THE ALLEGED FALSE STATEMENT 
OF DEFENDANT THAT THE RESERVOIR BE-
LONGTOME. 
The evidence clearly shows that such an alleged 
false statement was made to plaintiff Rex Pace alone. 
According to plaintiffs' testimony, he alone was told that 
the reservoir belonged to the defendant. 
While Mr. Parrish may have discussed water rights 
with the other plaintiffs, ( Tr. 30) there is no evidence that 
he told them that the reservoir belonged to him. Likewise 
the record is silent on Rex ever informing the other plain-
tiffs that such a statement was made. But Rex Pace, the 
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plaintiff who knew of the alleged statement, was the last 
to sign the contract; and he knew before he signed, that 
others had an interest in the-water stored in the reservoir. 
(Tr. 68, _85). He knew it on December 4th or 5th. He 
signed the contract on December 15, 1947. ( Tr. 63, 68). · 
LIKEWISE THE EVIDENCE FAILS TO SUPPORT 
A THIRD ELEMENT OF FRAUD. Viz. Did the plain-
tiffs have a right to rely on the statement of defendants 
as to the extent of the water on the premises. Here again 
there is no finding of the jury on that question, nor was 
it ever submitted to them. 
Wallace Parrish testifies that they knew ~at others 
had an interest in the reservoir before they made the down 
payment. (Tr. 165, 168, 170, and 173). They read the 
deed which contains no reference as to the amount of the 
water. (Tr. 71 and 84). 
Plaintiffs were farmers. (Tr. 26). They had exper-
ience in the operation of irrigated lands. ( Tr. 87). De-
fendant in showing them the property points out the 
reservoir to them. They make no inquiry as to the owner-
ship of the waters in the reservoir or of their right to the 
use thereof. They then wait six weeks to think it over. 
If they had once taken the time to follow the ditches 
which lead from the reservoir during one of their visits to 
the property they could have seen where the water was 
being used. 
Then they spend an entire day with the seller or his 
son. According to their staten1ent they still make no fur-
ther inquiry. 
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c'If the plaintiff ought, by reasonable diligence, to 
have known the truth or falsity of the statements, or 
had equal facilities for knowing as the defendant, he 
cannot, by blindly believing what he ought to have 
believed, or trusti~g where he ought not to have 
trusted, or by shutting his eyes whe,re he ought to 
have had them open, charge the defendant with the 
extent of his folly." (Stuck vs. Delta 63 Ut. 495. Ante.) 
"If a purchaser blindly trusts where he sh?uld not 
have trusted, and closes his eyes where ordi~ary pru-
dence require him to see, he is willing to be deceived. 
and the maxim "volenti noo fit injuria" applies." 55 
Am. Jur. 538. 
It would seem that four men pondering over the state-
ment "the r~~ervoir is on my property" for six weeks would 
have thou~h~ to have asked the defendant a simple quest-
ion as to how much water went with the property, or 
whether there was sufficient water to irrigate that portion 
susceptible of irrigation? If they had inquired they would 
have receiv~d the answer made, which they say came too 
late, viz: "Others have an interest in the reservoir." 
This excerpt from Clarke vs. Baird, 7 Barb. 66, is 
quoted with approval by our own Court in Gudmundsen 
vs. McEntyre 259 P 196, 70 Ut. 175: 
"The common law affords to every one reasonable 
protection against fraud in dealing, but it does not 
go the romantic length of giving indemnity against 
consequences of indolence and folly, or careless in-
difference to the ordinary and accessible means of 
information. ~ ~ ~ If the purchaser be wanting of 
attention to these points where attention would have 
been sufficient to protect him from surprise or im-
position, the m~xim caveat emptor ought to apply." 
See also MaWhinney vs. Jensen 232 P2d 769. 
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An inspection of the property was all that was neces-
sary to show the amount of land under irrigation-for them 
now to say they were deceived into believing they were 
buying wat~r right to permit them to water sage brush 
land and without a better showing is a fraud and deceit 
on the seller and neither they nor the jury have a right 
to reform the contract and make a new contract between 
the parties to any such effect. 
THE COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE ADOPTED 
AS ITS FINDING THE ANSWER OF THE JURY THAT 
PLAINTIFFS SUFFERED DAMAGE BY REASON OF 
A FALSE REPRESENTATION CONCERNING THE 
RESERVOIR IN THE SUM OF $4,320.00, FOR THERE 
IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT SUCH 
A FINDING. 
"Q. 
A. 
Here is the evidence, Witness Rex Pace testifying: 
You have enough water from the reservoir to farm 
the land you and Mrs. Parrish referred to as having 
been a farm? 
No. 
Q. You could use more? 
A. Yes. 
Q. 
A. 
"Q. 
How much_ of the reservoir do you believe you need 
to water what you are now farming? (They are now 
(Tr. 47) farming part of the river bottom land.) 
Well, I would use near half of it." (Tr. 48 ). 
Witness Rollins testifying: 
From your knowledge of the farm and its buildings, 
including the water stock or right it had in 1947, 
could you give an estimate of what you consider the 
entire unit would be worth in the month of Decem-
ber, 1947? 
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A. Well, I believe, the way farms were selling that time 
and in this locality, we didn'f hear of any farms sell-
ing at the price this farm sold for. We thought 
thirty or thirty-five thousand dollars was a good 
price at that time. · 
Q. If the farm had all the water rights on the place, 11~ 
acres of yours,· the south field with high state of 
productivity and 30 acres of river area that could 
have been as good as the south field, what would 
you say the farm would be worth? 
A. There is a lot of 'ifs' there. 
Q. Well e;xcluding the personal property and i~cluding 
just the real estate, the land and buildings on the 
property, and assuming the entire reservoir went 
with the farm, and your 11% acres went with it, and 
the south field was in a high state of productivity 
~ ~ ~ and assuming there were SO acres of river 
· bottom land that could be farmed, and assuming the 
land in Section 19 was of the same quality of soil, 
what would you value the fam at? 
A. That would make quite a farm of it. It would be 
worth forty or forty-five thousand. 
Q. for the land? 
A. You are excluding the machinery and personal pro-
perty? 
Q. Yes. 
A. I would say $40,000.00. 
Q. $40,000.00. 
A. Yes." (Tr. 108, 109). 
It would have been easy to have put to Witness 
Rollins these questions: What is the value of the water 
right sold? What could a fourth interest in the water right 
be purchased for? · 
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How much is the place worth with restricted water 
rights? That is }4 of the stock in the North West Irrigation 
Company? 
What would be its value if the place had full use of 
the reservoir? 
If answers to these questions haQ. been given there 
might be some basis on which the jury could have assessed 
damages. But not having been asked the jury had no 
basis on which it could determine the damage. There 
was no attempt to segregate the damage for alleged mis-
representation of the ownership of the reservoir from the 
damages from the alleged misrepresentation of the quality 
of the land in the south field. When the jury decided 
that there was no misrepresentation of the quality of ~he 
land in the south field they could only guess as fo the 
damage for misrepresentation of the owenrship of the . 
-- I 
reservoir. That seems exactly what they did. But the 
court in an equity case is not bound to accept that con-
jecture as its finding. If there is no direct evidence to 
sustain it; then it should be disregarded. 
Witness Rollins was the only witness as to values. 
When asked what the place was worth as sold he did not 
give his opinion but said we thought the place worth 30 
to 35 thousand. 
Who we were he did not explain; neither was he. clear 
whether it was worth thirty-five thousand or more. His 
only positive statement was that the place with the south 
field in high state of productivity, (and the jury found 
it was not.) (Tr. 213) and all of the reservoir (when plain-
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tiffs could only use one-half) (Tr. 48) and 30 acres of land 
that could be farmed, (there is no evidence that it could 
not ·be ) then it would be worth 40 thousand. 
Such testimony does not approach that degree of 
certainty and exactness which would occasion a loss of 
$4,320.00 to .these d~fendants. 
Compensatory damages must be proved in a tort 
action for deceit. 23 Am. Jr. 987, P 172. 
The evidence must afford data, facts and circum-
stances reasonably certain from which the jury may 
find actual loss; and the plaintiff must show by a 
preponderance of the evidence the damages caused 
by the injury complained of. 15 Am. Jur. page 796 
Par. 356. 
The damages must be susceptible of ascertaining 
in some manner other than by mere speculation, con-
jecture or surmise. 15 Am. Jr. page 415; Stevens vs. 
Mitchell 186 P2d 386, 103 ALR 546. 
A jury cannot mulch a suitor in damages where the 
evidence shows no reasonably accurate method or 
substantial basis for the ascertainment and compensa-
tion for the loss ascertained by a breach of the duty 
complained of. Othewise their verdict must be 
deemed to have resulted from the exercise of a mere 
arbitrary conclusion, one based on no substantial 
foundation. Grass vs. Big Creek D·ev. Co. 75 W.V. 
719, L.R.A. 1915 E 1057 quotation from 15 Am. Jur. 
796. 
However to authorize a recovery of more than 
nominal damages facts must exist which afford a 
l?asis of measuring the plaintiffs loss with reasonable 
certainty, and the evidence must be such that the 
jury may find the amount of his loss, not be conjec-
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ture, speculation and surmise, but by reasonable in-
ference from established facts. Western Union Tel. 
Co. vs. Ramsey 103 ALR 541; 261 Ky 657; Epp. vs. 
Hinton 138 P 576. 
We must therefore conclude that finding VII A 5 is 
not supported by the evidence and would not have been 
approved by the court as its finding to support its decree. 
Thus in the first cause of complaint there are at least 
five elements of fraud not supported by the evidence: 
1. The falsity of the statement. 
2. The speaker's fradulent intent. 
3. Plaintiffs reliance upon the statement. 
4. Their right to rely thereon. 
5. The consequent damage or injury. 
Three and five were adopted by the Court from the 
answers of the jury, and one, two and four were implied 
by the court in entering its judgment. 
If the appellate court should decide that any one of 
the five is not sustained by the evidence, or if in any one 
of the five the plaintiffs have not sustained the burden of 
proof then the judgment must be reversed so far as it 
pertains to damages for fraud and deceit by defendant in 
his representation as to the ownership of the reservoir. 
ARGUMENT - POINT II 
Before we review the evidence concerning the mis-
representation concerning the ·11 ~4 acres of Rollins land, 
let us view the general situation. Parrish's had little 
thought of selling their property. Rex Pace who was 
looking for a large tract finds the Parrish farm. They dis-
cuss the area of 645 acres and agree on a price subject to 
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the approval of the father and other brothers. They had 
sold their place for this amount. The price of $50,000.00 
had been agreed upon and they were out looking over 
the farm. There is no evidence that the purchasers were 
wavering and had to be persuaded to take the property 
or that any deceit was necessary to get them to buy. See 
Southern ·Development Co. v. Silvia, ante. Defendant had 
lived on farm since boyhood and had owned it for over 
thirty years. ( Tr. 127). He knew where his lines were. 
(Tr. 131). 
Now the testimony. Rex Pace testifying: 
''Q. What happened then? 
A. We moved down, you still could see the river bottom, 
the south field, as he called it, got a fairly good view 
of the ground, and, as we were sitting there in the 
car, he (Jos. A. Parrish) said, 'Brother, all you see 
below us belongs to me.' " ( Tr. 32). 
Byron Pace testifying: 
"Q. Now, while you were g9ing over this farm, did you 
stop at point "A" with Mr. Parrish and Rex? 
A. Yes. (~arrish denies they stopped at "A" and he 
made the remark attributed to him at that place. 
Tr. 131). 
Q. Did you hear Mr. Parrish make a statement that he 
has previously referred to. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What was the statement you heard at this time? 
A. He said, 'Brother all the ground you see down there 
belongs to me.' 
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Q. Did he make specific reference to the ground down 
there? 
A. Yes, I think so. 
Q. What did you ask him? 
A. If that large tract of ground was his. 
Q. What tract of ground do you refer? 
A. I think it is marked "E.'' 
Q. On Exhibit "A." 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is that the field you found out belonged to Rollins? 
A. Yes sir." (Tr. 92). 
That is not all but it is the substance of the evidence -
regarding the Rollins land. 
It is to be observed that point "A" where the alleged 
misrepresentation took place is about 0 mile or 160 rods 
from the nearest boundary to the Rollins land. (Exhibit 
c'A.") 
It must also be remembered that the conversation 
with reference to the Rollins land took place while the 
parties were seated in an automobile, one-half mile away. 
(Tr. 32). The land is designated by pointing (Tr. 195 
and 197), by land you see below (Tr. 190), by land down 
there (Tr. 9~), anrl by large tract (Tr. 195). Its location 
is not fixed by any physical markings. There is no speci-
fic reference to it. (Tr. 92 ). It is not described as the 
land covered by stubble, cultivated land, or the land just 
south of that unplowed, or that west of the fence on the 
township line. We must also remember that Mr. Parrish 
owned 160 acres of land that could be described as below 
point "A" where the parties were sitting and in the gen-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
33 
eral direction of the pointing that they could see. One 
·tract of 16 acres is contiguous to and on the same line or 
direction as the Rollins field. (See Exhibit "C.") 
In view of the fact that the sale had already been 
agreed upon and the seller had no motive in misrepresent-
ing the lartd that he owned would it not be more charitable 
to conclude that Paces were thinking of one tract of land 
and Parrish talking about another? 
Under the rule that the evidence of fraud must be 
clear and convincing and the burden of proof is on the 
one asserting the fraud, See Campbell vs. Zion Coop 
(ante), Taylor vs. Moore (ante.) Farrell vs. Wish well, 
(ante) we must conclude that the judgment for damages 
for misrepresentation by defendant as to the land he owned 
is not sustained· by the evidence and must be set aside. 
It must also be observed that if a fraud was com-
mitted it was committed on October 17, 1947. What 
plaintiffs thought about the land in 194;8 or in July 1950 
is immaterial. If they were deceived at all it was in 
October, 1947. We submit that no buyer can tell by view-
ing from a car a 11~ tract of land ~ mile away in Mount-
ain Green, Utah, in the month of October, whether it is 
gravelly, run down, full of weeds, or anything about its 
productivity. No man at that distance can tell whether 
it is the most choice land or least desirable in Morgan 
County. In fact I question that one can even guess its 
acreage. To say that a prospective purchaser of a 645 
acre farm was influenced in buying because he believed 
that a tract of 11~ acres was part of a 645 acre farm, a tract 
about which he knew not~ing as to productivity, or the 
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character of the soil, is beyond belief. Such a conclusion 
may pass in fiction, but cannot be justified in a legal 
fonun. 
The plaintiffs bought 645 acres of land and they got 
645 acres of land. If the judgment stands giving ·them 
damages for the 11~ acres they did not buy it in effect 
would give them 656% acres. 
A further reason why the judgment should be set 
aside is that the plaintiffs did not use due diligence to 
detrmine whether or not they were buying the Rollins 
tract. After the p~rty left Point "A" they drpve down 
the hill to point ccy" where they were within 30 rods of 
the Rollins land. (Tr. 191 and Exhibit "A"). 
Concerning their observations at this point Byron 
Pace asked: 
c'Q .. When you came back to the main road you were 
pretty close to the Rollins property were you not? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. You could see it very plain? 
A. We didn't know, but what is was, -
Q. I am not asking you that question, I asked if you 
could see it? , 
A. Yes, we could see that piece of ground. 
Q. You made no inquiries as to who it belonged to there, 
when you could see it plain? 
A. No." (Tr. 193) . 
c'Q. Did you notice clearly from point A the fence be-
tween your land and Rollin's field E that goes down 
on the map? 
A. No, I didn't. 
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Q.Did you see any designation bern:een the fields to indi-
cate there might be an obstacle? · 
A. Just a separation, plant one crop for fall and start 
anothe~ crop. 
Q. But the fence didn't appear clearly from point A? 
A. No sir. 
Q. Did you observe the fence as you progressed farther 
down? 
A. No sir, I didn't. (There was a fence line between the 
fields. ( Tr. 139). 
Q. You didn't bother to look at that? 
A. No." (Tr. 198). 
"If the plaintiff ought, by reasonable di~igent, to 
have known the truth or falsity of the statements, 
he cannot, by shutting his eyes when he ought to 
have had them open, charge the defendant with the 
extent of his folly." Stuck vs. Delta, ante. Gudmund-
sen vs. McEntyre, 259 P 196 at page 198; Shippman 
vs. Goldberg, 192 U.S. 232, 48 L. Ed. 419. 
In no event can the plaintiffs recover more than 
$2350.00 for damages for misrepresentation of the Rollin's 
land. Rollins, the only witness on values testified that 
the 11% acres were worth $200.00 per acre, ot $2350.00. 
(Tr. 103). 
ARGUMENT - POINT III 
The Court erred in approving and adopting as its 
finding the answer of the jury to interrogatory V (b) and 
V(c), and VII (a,3). (Tr. 214). (R. A 55-6). 
As one of the grounds of fraud plaintiff complains 
that while defendant was standing in the south field he 
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took a shovel and digging in the ground said, "The ground 
in the river bottom in Sec. 19 is the same quality as this 
ground. It is just like you see here;" that the ground in 
the 'river bottom' was greatly inferior to the south field. 
(R. A 3). 
The jury found that defendant repr~sented that the 
land in the river bo~tom was of the same quality as that 
in the south field; that said statement was false; that the 
plaintiffs when they purchased the property did so be-
lieveing that the ground in the two tracts were alike; that 
they did not rely on their own inspection when they pur-
chased the property, but relied on the defendant's state-
ment and they were damaged in the sum of $1750.00. 
(R. A. 56, Tr. 214). The court adopted these findings as 
its own and impliedly concluded that the plaintiffs had the 
right to rely on the alleged statements and rendered judg-
ment for damages against the defendants. In this we sub-
mit the court erred. 
The evidence showed that it was plaintiffs who did 
the digging in the south field., (Tr. 44). That they went 
over the river bottom land twice, (Tr.· 60) and could 
have dug in _the river bottom land; that the only repre-
presentation that defendant made was that the lands in 
the two fields were of the same texture, and no~ the same 
productive texture (Tr. 45); that they knew the land in 
the south fields was gavelly and contained rocks (Tr. 45); 
that the river bottom land had never been plowed (Tr. 
46); and was covered with sage and Parrish had only used 
it for pasture (Tr. 45); that they were not restrained from 
making an insp~ction of the property by the -defendant, in 
fact they were invited to inspect it; ( Tr. 91); that there 
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was no snow on the ground ( Tr. 60 ) ; that as a matter of 
fact the only difference between the land in the south 
field and that in the river bottom was that it had more 
rocks in it (Tr. 62); and they could see the rocks (Tr. 63); 
that they got out of the car and made an inspection of 
the river bottom land. (Tr. 60). 
It !Oust be observed that there is no representation 
as to the productivity of the soil in the river bottom land, 
but only a representation of its texture. It would seem 
to farmers this would be immaterial. They did not wish 
to use the land for a gravel pit, but only to produce crops, 
and as to its ability to produce crops no representations 
were made. 
We fail to see how a court can relieve the plaintiff 
of relying on their own observation. They were on the 
land and made an inspection thereof and were in no way 
restrained. They knew that defendant had never farmed 
the land. 
"Where the means of knowledge are open and at 
hand, it has been held that ,a purchaser cannot assert 
fraud against a vendor based upon the latter's false 
representations if he does not take the opportunity 
reasonably affo~ded to inform himself of the value 
of land by going upon it and making examination for 
himself." 55 Am. Jur. 538-539. 
"The rule has been l~id down in many cases where 
it is possible for the pu~chaser to inspect the land it 
is his d:uty to do so, and it is his own mistake or 
neg!Jgence if he relies on the representation of the 
vendor as to the quality and character of the land." 
55 Am. Jur. 553. 
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Again referring to Forrester v. Jasted 167 P. 55 where 
the trial court gave plaintiffs judgment for damages in 
an action where plaintiff, a shipcarpenter, noticed an 
advertisement in the newspaper which read in part: 
"Complete dairy and hog ranch. 60 acres of rich 
mellow soil. Not a roc~ or gravel." 
"The respondent repaired to the Seattle office of 
the realty company, where he was shown a sample 
of soil from the farm advertised, and was assured 
that the place was as represented. He was sent down 
to the Centralia office of the company the latter part 
of November, 1913, and was conducted by its local 
officers to the farm of the appellants Jastad. The 
day was cold and rainy, and only a couple of hours 
were spent in an inspection of the place, principally 
occupied in looking at the cleared portions of the 
land and the buildings and stock." 
The court reversed the judgment saying: 
"Likewise the rocky and gravelly character of the 
soil is not an element of fraud, as the buyer made 
personal inspection of the premises, and its gravelly 
condition was as apparent to a shipwright as it would 
be to any other person. The statement in the adver-
tisement that the farm had 'a rich, mellow soil, with-
out rock or gravel,' was of course a pure fabrication, 
probably invented by the realty agents, rather than 
the owner." 
The facts above quoted are so nearly alike the facts 
in the case in question as to be decisive of the issue in-
volved. Our court should follow the precedent of the 
Washington Supreme Court and reverse the judgment 
which gave $1750.00 for misrepresentation of the quality 
of the land in the r:iver bottom. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
39 
ARGUMENT - POINT IV 
The ~ourt erred in denying defendants motion for a 
new trial made on December 19, 1951, and overruling it 
on March 10, 1951. 
The -jury was prejudiced when it gave plaintiffs 
damages in the sum of $8750.00. We are frank to admit 
that defendants made a good bargain when they sold their 
. property plaintiffs for $50,000.00, but just because they 
made a good bargain is no reason for the jury to make ,a 
new one for them that more equitably met the minds of 
the jury. 
Here and there through out the trial there is evidence 
of the biased attitude. 
For example Lee Rollins testified that in December 
1947, his 11% acres was worth $200.00 per acre. (Tr. 103 ). 
Yet the jury awarded $2400.00 for the 11% acres. (Tr. 214, 
R. A56) ). 
Rex Pace testified that he could repair that part of 
the fenQ.e that was down for $100.00. (Tr. 214). The jury 
gave the plaintiffs $200.00. (R. A56). This prejudice 
was influenced by an unwarranted remark of the trial , 
judge when he asked defendant Ida E. Parrish if she 
wante,d to buy the place back. (Tr. 125). The appellate 
court should correct this misapprehension of a jury who 
wish to make a new contract for the parties. 
In this connection the trial court committed error 
when it pe5llitted the plaintiff (over the objection of the 
defendant) to cross-examine defendant Joseph A. Parrish 
as to the value of the property sold. ( Tt.. 14 and 15). 
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( R. A58) At that time no foundation had been laid for 
such testimony and it was not connected up until the testi-
mony of Lee Rollins as to the value of the property if it 
had been as represented. Permitting testimony as to values 
at that stage of the proceedings was highly prejudicial. 
Its only purpose was to make the jury believe that plaintiff 
had paid too much for the property. 
In adopting such a procedure it seems that the court 
took it for granted that a fraud had been committed and 
that the only province of the jury was to determine 
whether the plaintiffs had made a good buy and if they 
felt that he had paid too much for the property they were 
called upon to make a new contract for the parties and to 
sell the defendants form to the plaintiffs for such price as 
to the jury might seem proper. 
This court surely will not put its stamp of approval 
on such procedure and thus establish a precedent for the 
future. 
The trial court likewise erred in permitting the jury 
over the objection of the defendants to view colored slides 
of photographs taken of the Rollins land in the autumn 
of 1950. Especially when it was admitted that these 
photos did not represent a true picture of the Rollins land 
on the day it was inspected by the plaintiffs. The slides 
show the Rollins land a bright green because of a newly 
planted crop of alfalfa whereas on the date of the inspec-
tion of the premises the Rollins property was covered 
with stubble. ( Tr. 4, 5, 34, R A58). 
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ARGUMENT - POINT V 
We have already called attention to the lack of ~vi­
dence to support the judgment for $2400:00 damages for 
alleged · misrepresentations of the quantity of land, 
$1750.00. damages for alleged misrepresentations of the 
quality of the river bottom land, and $4320.00 damages 
for alleged misrepresentations of water rights. There are 
two minor items of damages that are not sustained by the 
evidence. 
1. With respec~ to the fences. The only evidence in 
the record is that defendant told Plaintiffs that the land 
was fenced and cross-fenced ( Tr. 51). There is nothing 
in the record to show that this was untrue. There is evi-
dence showing that about one-quarter of a mile of fence 
was out of repair, but it was fenced. ( Tr. 52). Plaintiffs 
Exhibit {;'A" clearly shows a red line around the entire 
farm and the red line indicates fences. 
2. The jury found that there were no items of per-
sonal property included in the sale that were not particu-
larly itemized in the bill of sale. ( Tr. 213). ( R. A54) 
Plaintiff is bound by that finding. 
The Court permitted testimony to show that between 
the date of the down payment on the purchase price of the 
property and the date the plaintiffs took possession of the 
same that some of the hay had been removed from the 
property. ( Tr. 70, 80). The jury after finding that plain-
tiffs had received a bill of sale to all the personal property 
that defendants had represented was included in the sale 
rendered a special verdict for $80.00 for damages pertain-
ing to person.al property. Finding VII B. and explained 
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that it was for damages for hay removed by some one after 
the sale had been made. (Tr. 215). The court approved 
this finding and included the $80.00 in the judgmen~. In 
this the Court erred. It is ~ot permitted to render judg-
ment on such inconsistent findings. 
Inconsistent and conflicting findings in special 
verdicts and answers to interrogatories neutralize each 
other and should be dis~egarded.' 53 Am. Jr. page 750 Par. 
1082. 
"VE SUBMIT THAT THE JUDGMENT SHOULD 
BE REVERSED. 
Respectfully submitted, 
L. TOM PERRY, 
PRESTON AND H-ARRIS, 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Appellants. 
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